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MERTON AND THE HOT TUB: 
SCIENTIFIC CONVENTIONS AND 
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN AUSTRALIAN 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
GARY EDMOND* 
 The ethos of science in that affectively toned complex of values and norms which 
is held to be binding on the man of science. The norms are expressed in the form of 
prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions. They are legitimized in 
terms of institutional values. . . .  
. . .  
 Four sets of institutional imperatives—universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, organized skepticism—are taken to comprise the ethos of modern 
science.1 
Robert K. Merton, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order (1942) 
 
hot tub n 
A large round bathtub filled with hot water for one or more people to relax, bathe, or 
socialize in; Jacuzzi trademark. 
ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2008) 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the continuing influence of scientific conventions on 
legal practice and law reform. Focused on the introduction of “concurrent 
evidence,” it describes how changes to Australian civil procedure, motivated by 
judicial concerns about the prevalence of partisanship among expert witnesses, 
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 1.  Robert K. Merton, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 
115 (1942), reprinted as ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, 268–70 (Norman W. Storer ed., 
1973) (emphasis added). 
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may have been enfeebled because they were based upon enduring scientific 
conventions such as the “ethos of science.”2 
Historically, adversarial legal systems have left the selection and refinement 
of evidence to the parties. This devolution, sometimes referred to as “free 
proof,” applies to all kinds of evidence, including expert evidence.3 Recently in 
Australia, common-law judges began to modify the way expert evidence is 
prepared and presented. Judges from a range of civil jurisdictions have 
conscientiously sought to reduce expert partisanship and the extent of expert 
disagreement in an attempt to enhance procedural efficiency and improve 
access to justice. One of these reforms, concurrent evidence, enables expert 
witnesses to participate in a joint session with considerable testimonial latitude. 
This represents a shift away from an adversarial approach and a conscientious 
attempt to foster scientific values and norms. 
This article describes the environment out of which concurrent evidence 
emerged as well as the operation of concurrent evidence and related pretrial 
activities. It then reproduces the primary justifications for concurrent evidence 
before undertaking a more critical review based on observations, interviews, 
and engagement with specialist literatures. 
II 
PROBLEMS WITH EXPERT EVIDENCE: ADVERSARIAL BIAS, COST, AND DELAY 
It is not only U.S. litigants and commentators who have attributed serious 
socio-legal problems to expert evidence.4 Over the last decade, English and 
Australian judges have become increasingly anxious about the quality of expert 
evidence appearing in courts, particularly in their civil-justice systems. An 
influential survey of judges and magistrates undertaken at the turn of the 
millennium identified bias and partisanship as the most pressing problems with 
expert evidence in Australia.5 According to its authors, judges “identified 
partisanship or bias on the part of expert witnesses as an issue about which they 
were concerned and in respect of which they thought that there needed to be 
change.”6 In response, Australian judges and law-reform agencies have focused 
their attention on “adversarial bias,” the partisanship associated with the 
 
 2. See MERTON, supra note 1, at 268–70. 
 3. ANDREW LIGERTWOOD, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2004).  
 4. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50–55 (1901) (examining the various methods of utilizing expert evidence). See 
generally PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1990) 
(polemical account of the negative impacts of dubious scientific evidence and practices on legal and 
social outcomes). 
 5. IAN FRECKELTON, PRASUNA REDDY & HUGH SELBY, AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERT EVIDENCE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1999).  
 6. Id. at 113. For criticism of this study, see Gary Edmond, Judging Surveys: Experts, Empirical 
Evidence and Law Reform, 33 FED. L. REV. 95, 127–35 (2005). 
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alignment or identification of an expert with a party and its interests.7 Concerns 
about adversarial bias have led senior judges to change the rules of civil 
procedure in an attempt to discipline expert witnesses. 
In order to understand the Australian legal context in which these 
developments occurred, it is useful to describe developments in England and to 
distinguish them from those in the United States. Like the United States, 
Australia is a federation composed of states and adversarial jurisdictions. Since 
European settlement, Australians have, with a few exceptions, looked to 
England for legal authority and law-reform initiatives. One reform, in 
particular, dramatically changed the Australian civil-justice landscape. By the 
late 1980s, most Australian jurisdictions had followed the English lead and 
effectively abolished the civil jury.8 Consequently, the vast majority of civil 
litigation in Australia is now heard and decided by a single judge. The elevation 
of legally trained judges to fact finder has changed many of the rules and trial 
dynamics in civil litigation.9 
During the last decade, in the wake of a prominent inquiry into civil justice 
undertaken by Lord Woolf and subsequent, substantial procedural reform in 
England, Australian judges began to modify their rules of civil procedure. 
Concerns with expert evidence, particularly concerns about partisanship and 
the costs associated with adversarial legal procedures, were prominent in 
Woolf’s Access to Justice report and subsequent reforms to the English Civil 
Procedure Rules.10 Throughout his inquiry, Woolf openly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the proliferation of expert witnesses and the growth of a 
“litigation support industry.”11 
Following the English example, Australian law-reform commissions and 
senior judges recommended and instituted a range of generic reforms in an 
attempt to reduce adversarial bias as well as the costs and delays widely 
attributed to the provision of expert evidence. These aims were embodied in 
legislation such as the Civil Procedure Act, enacted in 2005 in New South Wales, 
which provides that “the practice and procedure of the court should be 
implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such 
a way that the costs to the parties is proportionate to the importance and 
complexity of the subject-matter in dispute.”12 The objectives of the Act aspire 
 
 7. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, EXPERT WITNESSES (REPORT 109) 71 (2005); 
see also AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (REPORT 89) ¶ 1.121 (2000) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial 
system).  
 8. There is no constitutional guarantee of a civil jury in Australia. See BERNARD CAIRNS, 
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 506–536 (6th ed. 2005). 
 9. Also, in most Australian civil jurisdictions, costs are normally awarded against the unsuccessful 
party. Id. at 469–471. 
 10. Civil Procedure Rules, 1999 (Eng. & Wales). 
 11. HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES Ch. 13, ¶¶ 1–2 (1996). 
 12. Civil Procedure Act, 2005, § 60 (N.S.W.). 
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to the “just, quick and cheap resolution of . . . proceedings.”13 The formal 
rationale behind concurrent evidence links this new procedure to an 
institutional ethos motivated by the need for more-efficient legal practice and 
more-impartial expert advice. Though not adopted from England, the practice 
of introducing concurrent evidence corresponds with an express commitment to 
improving legal processes and public access to law.14 
Notwithstanding apprehension about bias, Australian judges have 
maintained a more liberal posture toward expert evidence than have most U.S. 
courts. They have not, for example, developed a particularly exclusionary 
approach to admissibility decisionmaking.15 As the primary fact finders in civil 
litigation, Australian judges retain considerable influence over expert evidence 
even after admission. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Australian judges have 
not had to develop an exclusionary jurisprudence to manage their dockets or 
become gatekeepers to prevent juries from hearing marginal expert evidence.16 
They can, for example, moderate the interpretation and weight they attach to 
expert evidence in their written decisions. 17 In consequence, the Daubert trilogy 
and concerns about the reliability of expert evidence have exerted very limited 
influence in Australia (and England).18 
III 
WHAT IS CONCURRENT EVIDENCE? 
Basically, concurrent evidence (also known by the sobriquet, “hot tub”) is a 
civil procedure employed when parties have secured the services of experts and 
those experts disagree about one or more issues pertinent to the resolution of a 
dispute.19 Concurrent evidence enables experts from similar or closely related 
fields to testify together during a joint session. The openings of these sessions 
tend to be more informal than examination-in-chief (that is, direct) and cross-
examination, which are associated with conventional adversarial proceedings. 
For at least part of their testimony, experts are freed from the constraints of 
formally responding to lawyers’ questions. During concurrent-evidence 
 
 13. Id. § 56. 
 14. See Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address Before 
the Expert Witness Institute of Australia and the University of Sydney Faculty of Law: The New Rules 
(Apr. 16, 2007), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/ 
SCO_mcclellan160407. 
 15. See Gary Edmond, Specialised Knowledge, The Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: 
Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence, 31 U. N.S.W. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2008) (examining 
Australian judges’ reluctance to exclude or limit expert evidence). 
 16. Id. at 49–55. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner 522 U.S. 
136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). For Australian cases, see, for example, 
R v. Tang, (2006) 65 N.S.W.L.R. 681. For England, see, for example, R v. Gilfoyle, [2001] 2 A.C. 57 
(Crim. Div.); R v. Dallagher, [2003] 1 A.C. 195 (Crim. Div.). 
 19. See King v. Military Rehab. and Comp. Comm’n (2005) 83 A.L.D. 322, ¶ 22 (Admin. App. 
Trib.). 
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sessions, expert witnesses are usually presented with an opportunity to make 
extended statements, comment on the evidence of the other experts, and are 
sometimes encouraged to ask each other questions and even test opposing 
opinions. 
The extracts below illustrate some of the ways in which concurrent evidence 
operates in practice. In the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, 
[a]t trial, the experts are sworn in and give evidence at the same time. It is often useful 
to have a written agenda of matters to be dealt with in oral evidence. The experts have 
an opportunity to explain their position on an issue and to question the other witness 
or witnesses about their position. Questions are also asked by counsel for the parties 
and the judge. In effect, the evidence is given through discussion in which the experts, 
the advocates and the judge participate. Questions and discussion on a particular issue 
by all experts can be completed before moving on to the next issue.20 
A second description, taken from a decision by Justice Lockhart in the 
Trade Practices Tribunal, is one of the earliest documented examples of a 
concurrent-evidence procedure in operation. 
Four expert witnesses in the field of economics furnished statements and were 
examined orally before the Tribunal at the hearing. The Tribunal adopted the 
following procedure with respect to expert witnesses, for the purpose of obtaining the 
maximum benefit from their evidence and removing them from the adversary process 
as far as possible: 
• At the conclusion of all the evidence (other than the evidence of the experts) and 
before the commencement of addresses, each expert was sworn immediately after 
the other and in turn gave an oral exposition of his or her expert opinion with 
respect to the relevant issues arising from the evidence. 
• Each expert then in turn expressed his or her opinion about the opinions 
expressed by the other experts. 
• Counsel then cross-examined the experts, being at liberty to cross-examine on the 
basis (a) that questions could be put to each expert in the customary fashion (i.e. 
one after the other completing the cross-examination of one before proceeding to 
the next), or (b) that questions could be put to all or any of the experts, one after 
the other, in respect of a particular subject, then proceeding to the next subject. Re-
examination [re-direct] was conducted on the same basis. 
In the result we gained assistance from the evidence of the experts. Their oral 
expositions and examinations occupied only three and one-half hours.21 
Concurrent evidence sessions usually involve two to four experts, although 
they can be considerably larger. It is not uncommon to hold several concurrent-
evidence sessions during a single proceeding, each featuring different types of 
experts. It is also not uncommon for experts from different fields to be joined in 
the determination of a single issue. The following examples are drawn from the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), a federal body responsible for merits 
reviews of administrative decisions. The case involved a challenge to the 
 
 20. Peter Biscoe, Judge, Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Address at the Australasian Conference of 
Planning and Environment Courts and Tribunals, Expert Witnesses: Recent Developments in New 
South Wales (Sept. 16, 2006), ¶ 15, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/ 
vwFiles/Speech_16Sept06_BiscoeJ_Expert_Witness.doc/$file/Speech_16Sept06_BiscoeJ_Expert_Witne
ss.doc (emphases added); see also Stockland Dev. Pty Ltd. v. Manly Council, No. 10428, 2004 WL 
1926821 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., Aug. 3, 2004); BGP Prop. Pty Ltd. v. Lake Macquarie City Council, 
(2004) 138 L.G.E.R.A. 237, 263. 
 21. Re Queensl. Indep. Wholesalers Ltd. (1995) 132 A.L.R. 225, 231–32. 
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determination of the geographical boundary for the Coonawarra, one of 
Australia’s most prestigious wine regions. Experts in viticulture, horticulture, 
hydrology, and wine production comprised the first panel in the “hot tub.” The 
second panel of experts likewise included viticulturists, but had as well experts 
in cartography, geography, and soil science.22 Other panels were composed of 
historians and those with expertise in the marketing of wine.23 The large number 
of experts and range of their specializations may not be entirely representative, 
but these examples provide some indication of how the concurrent evidence 
sessions can combine experts from a range of disparate, though contextually 
related, specializations. 
Most of the concurrent-evidence sessions I have observed break down into 
two quite distinct parts. The first stage represents a major shift from 
conventional adversarial proceedings. During this stage, all of the experts are 
asked to comment, sometimes in very general terms, about the case, the issues, 
their opinions, and the differences between them. These comments can be 
protracted and are sometimes punctuated by questions from the lawyers, the 
judge, and even the other experts participating in the session. The questions, at 
least initially, tend to be of an elucidatory nature. Once each of the experts has 
explained her position, she usually supplements her initial testimony with 
comments on the opinions and testimony of the other experts. The judge, rather 
than the lawyers, often presides over this first stage. Sometimes the judge 
suggests topics and directs the experts to comment on legally relevant issues. It 
is common for judges to ask questions and not uncommon for them to ask lots 
of questions. At the end of this first stage (or sometimes at the end of the entire 
concurrent-evidence session), the experts are usually asked if there is anything 
they would like to add, qualify, or clarify. 
The second stage of the concurrent-evidence session more closely resembles 
the conventional adversarial trial. Here, the lawyers reassert control by 
directing questions to the expert witnesses. Usually, there is little need for 
examination-in-chief and the lawyers begin by cross-examining the opposing 
experts in the usual order. The presence of several expert witnesses allows 
questions to be put to more than one witness, and witnesses can be asked to 
comment on the other experts’ answers. During the second stage, because of the 
attempt to produce a less adversarial environment, the lawyers (usually 
barristers) are not always sure about their entitlement to vigorously cross-
examine, and experts are sometimes uncertain about the extent of their 
constraint. 
Variations in practice reflect not only institutional traditions and rules (or 
lack of rules) associated with the different courts and tribunals in which 
 
 22. Re Coonawarra Penola Wine Indus. Ass’n Inc., No. S2000/182, ¶¶ 61, 65 (Admin. App. Trib., 
Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2001. 
 23. See Gary Edmond, Disorder with Law: Determining the Geographical Indication for the 
Coonawarra Wine Region, 27 ADEL. L. REV. 59, 158–60 (2006) (documenting a contentious dispute 
over geographical boundaries and the application of scientific-expert evidence). 
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concurrent evidence is received, but also differences between cases, the 
predilections of judges and lawyers, as well as the number, type, and experience 
of experts. Depending on how concurrent-evidence sessions are 
operationalized, varying degrees of control are retained by lawyers or obtained 
by the experts and the judge (at the expense of the lawyers). 
The introduction of concurrent evidence has been supplemented by a 
number of interrelated reforms.24 The most significant of these reforms are the 
pretrial joint meeting (also known as a joint conference or conclave), which 
leads to the production of a joint report, and the imposition of a formal code of 
conduct. 
Aspiring to make trials run more efficiently, many Australian courts now 
require experts from related fields to meet, preferably face-to-face and usually 
in the absence of lawyers, prior to the trial. 
Before giving evidence, experts of the same discipline confer and produce a joint 
report which sets out the matters on which they agree, the matters on which they 
disagree and their reasons for disagreement. This enables the Court to identify the 
differences which remain between them and which require resolution through their 
oral evidence.25 
These meetings are intended to enable the experts to identify the extent of their 
agreement or disagreement, resolve or narrow differences, and reduce their 
respective positions to writing in the form of a joint report that they are 
required to endorse. This joint report, it is hoped, will help to procure 
settlement. Ordinarily, only the areas of disagreement will be “live” should the 
case proceed to trial. 
During the joint conferences “an expert witness must exercise his or her 
independent, professional judgment . . . and must not act on any instruction or 
request to withhold or avoid agreement. An expert should not assume the role 
of advocate for any party during the course of discussions at the joint 
conference.”26 The expectation that experts will be independent and 
professional servants of the court (and justice) is longstanding.27 
In Australia, these expectations are now formally elaborated in a related 
series of reforms. In the late 1990s, in response to Woolf’s review and domestic 
concerns about the detrimental effects of bias, Australian judges began to 
impose codes of conduct on expert witnesses.28 These codes represent an 
attempt to eradicate the partisan culture widely associated with expert 
witnessing. Now expert witnesses in most Australian jurisdictions are required 
 
 24. Several Australian jurisdictions have embarked on more-fundamental reforms, which include 
encouraging parties to select a joint (or single) expert between them or risk the court appointing one. 
See, e.g., Geoffrey Davies, Current Issues—Expert Evidence: Court Appointed Experts, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 
367 (2004) (describing disadvantages of the adversarial system). 
 25. Biscoe, supra note 20, ¶ 15; see also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.26 (N.S.W.). 
 26. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.23 (N.S.W.). 
 27. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18–22 (2004). 
 28. See, e.g., Federal Court Rules, Order 34 A.3 (Austl.). 
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to comply with a formal protocol and to sign a declaration to that effect in every 
case. These codes explicitly and unambiguously emphasize that “an expert 
witness is not an advocate for a party.”29 Rather, an “expert witness’s 
paramount duty is to the court and not to any party in the proceedings.”30 In 
addition, the codes require expert witnesses to work cooperatively; “endeavor 
to reach agreement”; list facts and assumptions on which their opinions are 
based; identify any literature, materials, “examinations, tests, or other 
investigations” relied upon; specify any limitations of their opinions; and 
indicate if their opinion is inconclusive or requires further research or data.31 
Although codes of conduct and formal declarations represent an attempt to 
regulate the performance of experts that predates the institutionalization of 
concurrent evidence, the codes are now used in conjunction with all procedures 
pertaining to expert witnesses. The duties emanating from the codes, along with 
the underlying model of expertise, are consistent with the expectations for 
conduct in pretrial meetings, the production of joint reports, and the 
concurrent-evidence sessions. 
IV 
MARKETING “HOT TUBS” 
The basic concurrent-evidence technique emerged out of experiments in the 
1970s.32 Since that time, with the support of judges like Lockhart, Lindgren, and 
Heerey, this technique was used intermittently in tribunals and very 
occasionally in the Federal Court of Australia.33 The institutionalization of 
concurrent evidence, however, is a far more recent development.34 In the last 
five years, concurrent-evidence procedures have been formally adopted in the 
Federal Court, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Supreme Courts of 
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory,35 and the Land and 
Environment Court of New South Wales; it has also been used selectively in the 
superior courts of New Zealand.36 
 
 29. FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, PRACTICE DIRECTION: GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT 
WITNESSES IN PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA (2008), available at 
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/prac_direction.html#current. 
 30. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 3.13 (N.S.W.). 
 31. Id. at Schedule 7, § 31.23. These were derived from English cases, such as: Ikerian Reefer, 
[1995] 1 A.C. 455; R v. Harris, [2005] 1 A.C. 5; R v. B, [2006] 2 A.C. 3. 
 32. See, e.g., Re Queensl. Indep. Wholesalers Ltd. (1995) 132 A.L.R. 225, 231–32. 
 33. See, e.g., Re Rosenthal and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2000/378, 2002 WL 31256991 (Admin. 
App. Trib., Oct. 9, 2002). 
 34. See, e.g., Federal Court Rules, Order 34A.3 (Austl.); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 
31.35 (N.S.W); Supreme Court Rules, 2006, (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Prominent case law examples include Alphapharm Pty Ltd. v. H. Lundbeck A/S, No. 1120, 
2008 WL 1891368, ¶ 58 (Austl., Apr. 24, 2008); Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare (Austl.) Pty Ltd. v. 
Minister for Env’t and Heritage (2006) 93 A.L.D. 625, ¶¶ 43–45 (Admin. App. Trib.); Walker Co. v. 
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Auth., No. 30024, ¶¶ 1–13 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., Apr. 19, 2004), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2004; Powerco Ltd. v. Commerce 
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The institutionalization of concurrent evidence has been accompanied by a 
publicity campaign dominated by senior members of the Australian judiciary 
(also described as “proponents”). The extracts below present the major 
arguments advanced in support of the new procedures. The ability to 
comprehensively reproduce the primary justifications seems to outweigh the 
limited inconvenience of a little repetition. 
 Experience shows that provided everyone understands the process at the outset, 
in particular that it is to be a structured discussion designed to inform the judge and 
not an argument between the experts and advocates, there is no difficulty in managing 
the hearing. Although I do not encourage it, very often the experts who will be sitting 
next to each other, normally in the jury box in the courtroom, end up referring to each 
other on first name terms. Within a short time of the discussion commencing, you can 
feel the release of the tension which normally infects the evidence gathering process. 
Those who might normally be shy or diffident are able to relax and contribute fully to 
the discussion. 
 This change in procedure has met with overwhelming support from the experts 
and their professional organisations. They find that they are better able to 
communicate their opinions and, because they are not confined to answering the 
questions of the advocates, are able to more effectively respond to the views of the 
other expert or experts. They believe that there is less risk that their expertise will be 
distorted by the advocate’s skill. It is also significantly more efficient. Evidence which 
may have required a number of days of examination in chief and cross-examination 
can now be taken in half or as little as 20% of the time which would have been 
necessary. 
 As far as the decision-maker is concerned, my experience is that because of the 
opportunity to observe the experts in conversation with each other about the matter, 
together with the ability to ask and answer each others questions, the capacity of the 
judge to decide which expert to accept is greatly enhanced. Rather than have a 
person’s expertise translated or coloured by the skill of the advocate, and as we know 
the impact of the advocate is sometimes significant, you actually have the expert’s own 
views expressed in his or her own words.37 
Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W. 
 One assumption of the adversarial system is that argument between people (even 
heated argument) is the most satisfactory means of resolving a controversy. It accepts 
that parameters of the debate and the management of the process will be controlled 
by advocates for whom the intellectual integrity of the outcome is not imperative. 
Their concern is to advance the interests of the client. We accept this approach to 
resolving factual questions, which involve a challenge to a witness’s recollection, 
credibility or reliability. We have, I suggest, without much thought, accepted the same 
approach to experts. 
 One consequence of the adversarial system is that witnesses, including many 
experts, consciously or unconsciously perceive themselves to be on one side or the 
other of the argument. Apart from the inefficiencies involved, the process discourages 
many of the most qualified experts from giving evidence. It is commonplace to hear 
people who have much to offer the resolution of disputes—doctors, engineers, valuers, 
accountants and others—comment that they will not subject themselves to a process 
which is not efficient in using their time. It is equally common to be told that the 
 
Comm’n, No. 2005 485 1066, ¶ 74 (N.Z., June 9, 2006), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/cases/ 
NZHC/2006. 
 37. Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the 
LAWASIA Conference: Expert Witnesses—The Experience Of The Land & Environment Court Of 
New South Wales (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vw 
Files/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc/$file/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc. 
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person will not give evidence in a forum where the fundamental purpose of the 
participants is to win the argument rather than seek the truth. A process in which they 
perceive other experts to be telling “half truths” and which confines them to 
answering only “the questions asked” depriving them of the opportunity, as they see 
it, to accurately inform the court is rejected as “game playing” and a waste of their 
time.38 
Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W. 
In my experience, the Hot Tub procedure brings a number of benefits which include 
the following. First, the experts give evidence at a time when the critical issues have 
been refined and the area of real dispute narrowed to the bare minimum. Secondly, 
the judge sees the opposing experts together and does not have to compare a witness 
giving evidence now with the half-remembered evidence of another expert given 
perhaps some weeks previously and based on assumptions which may have been 
destroyed or substantially qualified in the meantime. Thirdly, the physical removal of 
the witness from his party’s camp into the proximity of a (usually) respected 
professional colleague tends to reduce the level of partisanship. Fourthly, the 
procedure can save a lot of hearing time.39 
Peter Heerey, Judge of the Federal Court of Australia 
Concurrent evidence can have a number of virtues over the traditional process: 
 1. The evidence on one topic is all given at the same time. 
 2. The process refines the issues to those that are essential. 
 3. Because the experts are confronting one another, they are much less likely to act 
 adversarially. 
 4. A narrowing and refining of areas of agreement and disagreement is achieved 
 before cross-examination. 
 5. Cross-examination takes place in the presence of all the experts so that they can 
 immediately be asked to comment on answers of colleagues.40 
Garry Downes, Judge of the Federal Court of Australia and President of the AAT 
Requiring all evidence to be given concurrently reduced the importance of cross-
examination by lawyers and increased the importance of questions designed to elicit 
the common ground, the areas of divergence and the reasons for divergence.41 
Brian Preston, Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court of N.S.W. 
According to these judges, concurrent evidence transforms the agonistic 
adversarial trial into a more cooperative enterprise in which scientific attitudes 
and values are afforded opportunities to manifest and flourish. The main 
benefits attributed to concurrent evidence (and associated procedural reforms) 
might be summarized as follows: 
 
 38. Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the 
Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Annual Conference: Expert Evidence—Aces Up 
Your Sleeve (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc. 
nsf/pages/SCO_mcclellan 201006. 
 39. Peter Heerey, Recent Australian Developments, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 386, 391 (2004). 
 40. Garry Downes, Judge of the Fed. Court of Austl., Address at the Inter-Pacific Bar Association 
Conference: The Use of Expert Witnesses In Court and International Arbitration Processes (May 3, 
2006), available at http://www.aat.gov.au/SpeechesPapersAndResearch/speeches/downes/UseExpert 
WitnessesMay2006.htm. 
 41. Brian Preston, Chief Judge of the Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Address Before the 
Australian Environmental Business Network: Ongoing Reforms of Practice and Procedure (June 16, 
2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vwFiles/Paper_14Jun06_Preston 
_Reforms.doc/$file/Paper_14Jun06_Preston_Reforms.doc. 
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Virtues Textual support / Footnote42 
Concurrent evidence embodies the scientific ethos: it 
provides a discursive, cooperative environment and 
facilitates peer review. 
 
19, 20, 36, 37, 
38, 39, 40 
Experts like concurrent evidence. 
 
36, 37 
Concurrent evidence reduces partisanship 
(i.e., “adversarial bias”). 
 
36, 37, 38, 39 
Concurrent evidence enhances communication, 
comprehension, and decisionmaking. 
 
19, 20, 36, 
38, 39, 40 




Concurrent evidence saves time, money, and 
institutional resources. 
 
20, 24, 36, 
37, 38, 39 
  
V 
MORE CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
Now we can start to turn up the heat on the “hot tub” and reconsider some 
of the assumptions and advantages used to justify its introduction and use. 
Although many of these issues require further empirical investigation, some 
observations based on contributions from historians and sociologists, along with 
the responses of those who have participated in concurrent-evidence sessions, 
can contribute to the fire. 
A. The Scientific Ethos? 
Proponents contend that, unlike conventional adversarial procedures, 
concurrent evidence embodies the values of science or allows the scientific 
ethos to more readily surface.43 Codes of conduct, pretrial meetings (without 
lawyers), and concurrent-evidence sessions are credited with facilitating a 
cooperative “discussion,” which allows the experts to assist the court in 
reaching a decision more effectively. Settlement and resolution are more readily 
facilitated because the proximity of peers provides a powerful disciplining 
 
 42. “Textual support” refers to extracts reproduced throughout this article and AUSTL. LAW 
REFORM COMM’N, Review of The Adversarial System of Litigation: Issues Paper 24, 7.10 (1998), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/24/ALRCIP24.html; see also 
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(REPORT 89) (2000); ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, AN EVALUATION OF THE USE OF CONCURRENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL (2005). 
 43. See sources supporting “Virtue 1” in Table, asserting that concurrent evidence embodies the 
scientific ethos. See, e.g., McClellan, supra notes 37–38. 
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influence.44 Further, experts may prefer concurrent evidence because of the 
familiar, cooperative approach to resolving disagreement and uncertainty. 
Proponents, appealing to scientific norms and the efficacy of peer participation, 
suggest that concurrent evidence provides a means of securing less-partisan and 
less-extreme expert advice.45 Unfortunately, these justifications are predicated 
upon romanticized images of expertise and expert disagreement.46 Thus, it is 
useful to make a few remarks about judicial appeals to the “ethos of science” 
and peer review. 
The sociologist Robert Merton offered an early and highly influential 
account of scientific norms and their social functions. His work suggested that 
norms like “universalism,” “communism,” “disinterestedness,” and “organized 
skepticism” were central to scientific activity.47 Lacking Merton’s sociological 
and historical sophistication, modern reformers routinely (and unwittingly) 
promote elements of his sociology—developed in response to the rise of fascism 
in the 1930s—as some kind of timeless prescription for all authentic scientific 
activity.48 This not only caricatures Merton’s work on the normative structure of 
science but removes his scholarship from its historical context. To the extent 
that Australian legal reforms are based, even loosely, around such normative 
constructs, they trivialize both modern sociological endeavors and, more 
importantly, changes to scientific and biomedical practice. 
More recent sociological investigation suggests that the norms described by 
Merton are unlikely to guide scientific practice or assessments of scientific 
knowledge. Appealing as norms may be, they are not prescriptive, and in many 
contexts they are open to inconsistent, though potentially legitimate, 
interpretations.49 Norms such as “disinterestedness,” “communalism,” and 
“organized skepticism” encounter more fundamental difficulties when 
considered in the context of changes to the organization and funding of 
scientific and biomedical research in the post-war era. The growth of 
pharmaceutical companies and the rise of biotech start-ups—in response to 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See sources supporting “Virtue 3” in Table, supra p. 160, asserting that concurrent evidence 
reduces partisanship. 
 46. See Gary Edmond, Judicial Representations of Expert Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REV. 216 (2000) 
(examining inconsistencies in the way scientific evidence is represented in legal proceedings and 
judgments); see also DAVID CAUDILL & LEWIS LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF 
SCIENCE IN THE LAW 49, 54–55 (2006) (noting the loose boundaries between social factors and 
scientific inquiry and practice). 
 47. See MERTON, supra note 1, at 266–78. “Communalism” and “communality” are often 
substituted for “communism.” 
 48. See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 38. 
 49. See Michael Mulkay, Norms and Ideology in Science, 15 SOC. SCI. INFO. 637–56 (1976) 
(discussing the roles of norms in scientific activity); Michael Mulkay, Interpretation and the Use of 
Rules: The Case of Norms of Science, in SCIENCE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR 
ROBERT K. MERTON 111 (Tom Gieryn ed., 1980) (discussing the important role of normative 
principles on scientific discourse and practice). 
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technological breakthroughs, changes to intellectual-property regimes, and the 
availability of private capital—are good examples.50 
Many of the practical limitations with the normative ethos were explored 
through empirical investigation. One study, conducted in the early 1970s, 
concluded that NASA scientists routinely contravened Mertonian-style norms.51 
Derogations from these norms were so pervasive that the investigator, Ian 
Mitroff, developed the idea of the “counter-norm.”52 Mitroff found that his 
NASA subjects accounted for their scientific activities using a variety of 
explanatory resources. When their behavior seemed to contravene popular 
expectations—such as the norms described by Merton—scientists simply 
appealed to a range of exceptions and qualifications that helped to legitimize 
(or excuse) what might otherwise have been considered aberrant (or even 
deviant). It was these principled derogations that were characterized as counter-
norms.53 Of interest, Mitroff noticed that departures from norms such as 
“disinterestedness” and “communalism” did not necessarily correlate with poor 
standing or a lack of credibility.54 Some of the most eminent and successful 
scientists—based on the standing of their research and institutional 
affiliations—were secretive, resented criticism, and adhered to “pet” theories in 
the face of adverse evidence. A corollary was that knowledge derived through 
secret, noncooperative, and interested activities was not necessarily understood 
as pathological or unreliable. These findings are consistent with subsequent 
investigations.55 
There are also difficulties with judicial appeals to “organized skepticism” in 
the guise of peer review. Proponents suggest that the proximity of colleagues 
will discipline and constrain expert performances, particularly the incidence of 
partisanship and adversarial bias.56 There are good reasons, however, for 
believing that peer participation will be less effective than proponents imply. 
After all, extensive sociological and biomedical literatures question the value 
and efficacy of scientific peer review.57 
Without delving into this vast literature, one illuminating issue merits 
discussion. While U.S. judges are searching for “reliability” through method 
 
 50. See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, THE EFFORTLESS ECONOMY OF SCIENCE (2004) (discussing 
the influence of economics on scientific practice); HELGA NOWOTNY, PETER SCOTT & MICHAEL 
GIBBONS, RE-THINKING SCIENCE (2001) (arguing for a fundamental reexamination of the distinction 
between society and science).  
 51. IAN MITROFF, THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF SCIENCE 85–88 (1974) (examining the role of 
subjective factors in scientific research). 
 52. Id. at 77. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 73–79. 
 55. See, e.g., HARRY COLLINS, GRAVITY’S SHADOW (2004) (sociological history of the decades-
long search for evidence of gravitational waves). 
 56. See, e.g., Heerey, supra note 39. 
 57. Pervasive assumptions about the efficacy of peer review and publication are critically appraised 
in Gary Edmond, Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal Implications of Changes to 
Biomedical Research and Publication, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 523, 523–31 (2008). 
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discourses (for example, testing), general acceptance, publication, and peer 
review, and while English and Australian judges are endeavoring to reduce 
adversarial bias through procedural reforms, increasing the proximity of 
experts, and facilitating a “discussion,” the world’s leading biomedical journals 
have resorted to more legalistic solutions to help them assess the value of 
contributions (that is, research papers submitted for publication). Rather than 
expose submissions to further peer review or place greater emphasis on formal 
adherence to method doctrines, members of the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors, for example, require information about conflicts of 
interest, commercial sponsorship, and the identity of all contributors, and they 
now mandate the prospective registration of clinical trials to help them 
identify—if not eliminate—forms of bias.58 These pragmatic responses to the 
impact of commercial sponsorship, by well-resourced biomedical journals with 
technically competent staffs, serve to highlight how the power attributed to 
scientific norms and the proximity of peers is not only exaggerated but unlikely 
to help judges reliably assess expert disagreement. 
More prosaically, in conventional adversarial proceedings expert advisers 
and expert witnesses often sit in the courtroom monitoring testimony. These 
“opposing” experts have access to expert reports and transcripts. Is it realistic to 
think that the concurrent participation of these experts—effectively moving 
them a few yards in the courtroom and allowing them to respond during the 
same session rather than a day or a week later—will produce a demonstrable 
change in behavior? 
Australian judges, concerned about the behavior of experts, seem to be 
intent on reducing adversarial bias through the provision of a space—in the 
adversarial trial and pretrial processes—that is shaped by scientific, rather than 
legal, conventions. To the extent that the new procedures have conflated 
idealized norms of science with actual scientific practice, this response might be 
imprudent. Proponents of concurrent evidence seem to believe that temporarily 
marginalizing the lawyers and facilitating a “discussion” in the midst of an 
adversarial process will overcome the influence of expert selection and the 
experts’ sensitivity to the parties’ causes of action, and, most remarkably, 
enable the experts to somehow transcend theoretical and professional 
commitments, as well as personal limitations. 
B. Partisanship and Adversarial Bias 
When it comes to assessing expert evidence, “partisanship” and “adversarial 
bias” are not particularly precise or analytically reliable concepts. They tend to 
be used selectively to privilege (or discount) particular experts and opinions. 
 
 58. INT’L COMM. OF MED. JOURNAL EDITORS, UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUSCRIPTS 
SUBMITTED TO BIOMEDICAL JOURNALS: WRITING AND EDITING FOR BIOMEDICAL PUBLICATION § 
II.D (2005). The ICMJE is a group of medical-journal editors, which includes participants from, among 
others, The New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, the 
British Medical Journal, and the Lancet. 
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All experts are (and expertise is) more or less aligned, subjective, interested, 
biased, and dependent. These alignments, interests, and limitations may assume 
a great variety of forms—be they theoretical, professional, institutional, 
financial, or personal. Whether (the appearance of) “bias,” “interests,” or 
“sponsorship” affects the reliability of expert evidence is a fundamental but 
complex issue.59 Although judges and fact finders should seek information about 
influences and biases, unfortunately this information will not always expedite 
resolution or simplify decisionmaking.60 
Procedural reforms based around “objectivity” and “impartiality” offer 
limited hope for improving the reception and treatment of expert evidence.61 
Not only do these concepts have limited analytical utility, but there is little 
evidence to suggest that adversarial bias is deliberate or consistently 
detrimental to civil practice. Although experts selected by the different parties 
may well take on aspects of a case, based in part on their contractual 
relationship, these experts will often be selected because they already adhere to 
particular assumptions and commitments or employ methodologies considered 
valuable. Even if not conspicuously or predictably aligned, experts (including 
court-appointed experts) do not enter disputes without professional, 
institutional, and ideological “baggage.”62 Expert selection may be far more 
important than any pressures or importunity brought about by adversarial 
alignment and interactions with parties and their lawyers. 
These observations have serious implications for concurrent evidence, and 
for the utility of codes of conduct and expert declarations. Without a reliable 
means of identifying deliberate partisanship—as opposed to genuinely held 
beliefs and opinions—and its impact on expert evidence, codes of conduct 
become abstract formulations with primarily symbolic value. Codes of conduct 
affirm the role of the expert as a servant of the court but fail to explain what 
that might mean to an expert with theoretical commitments, professional 
prejudices, particular visions of social justice, and a range of subsidiary 
obligations. 
Moreover, if partisanship is prevalent, then its persistence might be a 
consequence of the difficulty of appearing impartial along with a widespread 
realization that judges have practical problems disciplining partisan experts. 
Without more-sophisticated models of expertise, on what grounds are judges to 
 
 59. Steven Yearley, The Relationship Between Epistemological and Sociological Cognitive Interests, 
13 STUD. HIST. &. PHIL. SCI. 353, 375 (1982). See generally Steve Woolgar, Interests and Explanation in 
the Social Study of Science, 11 SOC. STUD. SCI. 365 (1981) (explaining the difficulties of using interests 
as explanatory resources). 
 60. Kenneth Rothman, Conflict Of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science, 269 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 2782, 2783 (1993) (a critical response to calls for full disclosure of conflicts of interest in 
biomedical research). 
 61. For an account of the socially contingent nature of “objectivity,” see generally LORRAINE 
DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY (2007). 
 62. See Laura Hooper, Joe Cecil & Thomas Willging, Assessing Causation in Breast Implant 
Litigation: The Role of Science Panels, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 151–54 (Autumn 2001) 
(describing problems with a court-appointed expert panel in large-scale litigation over breast implants). 
09_EDMOND__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC 4/2/2009  11:15:21 AM 
174 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:159 
apply sanctions against experts who breach their “duty” to the court or who are 
unable to achieve consensus around their opinions? How should judges 
determine whether reluctance to agree or to narrow the grounds of 
disagreement at a joint meeting or in a “hot tub” constitutes legitimate 
professional differences, or obduracy driven by a party’s desire for success at 
trial? Do judges possess the technical abilities to distinguish between willful 
breaches as opposed to genuine adherence to idiosyncratic views? When is 
adherence to a particular “school of thought” partisan and under what 
circumstances might it be reasonable or objective? What can judges do when 
experts hold firm opinions in areas widely accepted as uncertain or disagree 
about the extent of consensus in a field (or even the relevance of the field)? The 
recent reforms tell us little about possible sanctions for breaches of duties, or 
how such breaches might be ascertained and proved.63 
Even if claims about the prevalence of partisanship were not empirically 
justified, judicial recourse to problems created by “adversarial bias” and “junk 
science” might nevertheless be comprehensible. Institutional and professional 
benefits may accrue from the perpetuation of alarm about expert performances, 
especially the prevalence of bias and departure from the scientific ethos, in 
contexts where judges have to routinely resolve expert disagreement and 
explain their reasons for preferring one expert opinion to another. 
C. Enhancing Communication and Comprehension 
Claims for concurrent evidence are less controversial when restricted to 
improving communication and judicial comprehension. Disregarding questions 
about partisanship, evidentiary reliability, and the realities of scientific practice, 
it would seem difficult to challenge the contention that concurrent evidence has 
the potential to improve communication and enhance comprehension in 
court—especially if its use dramatically reduces the volume of expert testimony. 
If nothing else, concurrent-evidence procedures require the experts to meet and 
talk, they enable expert witnesses to give longer explanations using their own 
words, they encourage experts to comment directly on the testimony of others, 
and they provide a forum where judges are less restricted in their questioning of 
witnesses and enable fact finders to observe the interactions between experts.64 
Provided concurrent evidence retains provision for vigorous cross-
examination, even if the witnesses are no longer quite as restrained or servile, 
then it should help to improve communication and comprehension in the trial 
and on appeal.65 There are, however, no guarantees that concurrent evidence 
 
 63. Though longstanding, judicial concerns about expert partisanship have produced few 
disciplinary responses. See, e.g., Lord Abinger v. Ashton, (1873) 17 Ch. D. 358, 374 (noting biases of 
paid experts). 
 64. See generally MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE (Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996) 
(discussion of socially contingent approaches to expert knowledge).  
 65. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 200–216 (1995) (sociological account of the complex relations between law and science).  
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will narrow disagreement, encourage cooperation, increase settlement, or 
render decisionmaking easier, less controversial, or more accurate. 
D. Out of Sight, Out of Mind? 
Lawyers may lose some control over expert witnesses during the pretrial 
processes and in the more discursive openings of concurrent evidence. Means of 
retaining influence and predictability may, nevertheless, be at hand. Procedural 
efforts to reduce the ability of lawyers to influence expert evidence may actually 
have effects elsewhere in the process, such as in the choice of experts. If lawyers 
are excluded from pretrial meetings and marginalized during parts of the trial, 
then, in order to maintain some semblance of control and predictability, it will 
become increasingly important to select experts who understand what they 
need to do in the interests of the case while maintaining professional credibility 
before the legal institution. 
The introduction of concurrent evidence may encourage lawyers to select 
experts who are unlikely to make damaging concessions or to be maneuvered 
into compromising concessions by the experts retained by other parties. Many 
lawyers will be reluctant to cede control to experts unless they are confident 
that their experts understand the tacit rules of the game. Over time it may 
become even more important to select experts whose contribution to any open 
“discussion” is predictable and effective. Marginalizing lawyers may actually 
encourage the use of more-experienced expert witnesses. Ironically, the 
litigation specialists who seemed to irritate Lord Woolf may be the kind of 
experts that enable lawyers to maintain most control over pretrial proceedings 
and the evidence. These experts will be neither swayed nor exposed by codes of 
conduct. 
The reforms also make the production of the joint report particularly 
important. The need to complete joint reports with attention to detail seems to 
be an emerging feature of practice. Meeting and completing a binding 
(practically if not always technically) joint report adds to the costs of the 
pretrial processes. And, because agreement between the experts will tend to 
constrain the parties, in practice lawyers will ordinarily have a clear idea of 
what their expert will say, and there will be considerable pressure on the expert 
to adhere to the terms of the original advice (or report) or a position consistent 
with the client’s cause of action. 
One further implication—which involves crediting experts with agency—is 
that pretrial meetings provide experts with new opportunities and incentives to 
manage their participation. Proponents, drawing upon normatively charged 
visions of expertise and committed to institutional efficiencies, seem to think 
this is desirable.66 In so doing they tend to overlook the shared professional 
interests maintained by groups of experts, such as three neurosurgeons, meeting 
 
 66. See, e.g., McClellan, supra notes 37–38. 
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beyond the surveillance of the lawyers and judge.67 There are, of course, 
alternative ways to interpret expert consensus. By agreeing on a joint report, 
experts can dispose of suits, limit their exposure to cross-examination, and still 
receive substantial compensation for their pretrial activity. To some extent 
experts may be able to manage the scope of professional liability and even keep 
some disputes in-house. Away from the pressures of the courtroom and the 
gaze of the lawyers, experts are empowered to negotiate the terms and limits of 
the factual dispute. Once opposing experts strike agreement it will be difficult 
to explore the covert realm of expert negotiations or to reopen settled “facts.” 
E. Resource Implications and Logistics 
In some circumstances, concurrent evidence will reduce the amount of time 
required of expert witnesses and may clarify, or even resolve, the issues and 
areas of residual disagreement. Unfortunately, at present there are no ready 
means to determine which cases will produce these savings or how “quicker” 
and more “cost effective” justice should be assessed against more-refractory 
values such as fairness, accuracy, or institutional legitimacy.68 The only guides 
currently available are institutional presumptions qualified by issues of 
proportionality, procedural fairness, convenience, and personal preference. 
Concurrent evidence might well reduce costs in large-scale litigation in 
which many experts are scheduled to testify. Compelling two, but especially 
more, experts to testify simultaneously will often reduce the length of a trial by 
allowing them to each give an answer to the same question and to merely 
endorse or qualify the opinions of other experts. Also, the lawyers do not have 
to reintroduce the various issues or the opinions of other experts over and over. 
In some cases, though, having experts provide evidence concurrently will 
increase the time they spend in court while reducing the overall length and cost 
of the proceedings, themselves. 
When experts achieve consensus on substantial issues during the pretrial 
stages, more cases may be settled or abandoned. Generally though, the effects 
of concurrent evidence and pretrial meetings on settlement are unclear. The 
parties will often have solicited expert assistance before the joint meetings. So, 
if settlement occurs after these meetings, it will often be more expensive for the 
parties (if not for the court). If lawyers select more-predictable and intractable 
experts to compensate for their displacement from the pretrial phases, then it 
may prove more difficult to narrow the issues or to settle. 
A further difficulty arises from the physical layout of Australian 
courtrooms. Tribunals and most courts are designed to allow a single witness to 
 
 67. See CAROL JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
165–193 (1994) (socio-legal account of the role of experts in legal processes in England). 
 68. Admin. Appeals Tribunal, supra note 42, §§ 2.1, 2.28, 6.2; see also King v. Military Rehab. and 
Comp. Comm’n (2005) 83 A.L.D. 322, ¶ 22 (Admin. App. Trib.); Flintstones Garden Supplies Centres 
v. Greater Geelong CC, P1775/2006, ¶¶ 41–42 (Admin Trib. (Vict.), Apr. 19, 2007), available at http:// 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2007. 
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testify, usually from a dedicated witness box. When it comes to concurrent 
evidence, fitting more than two expert witnesses and the many exhibits and 
reports associated with expert testimony in these booths is often problematic. 
Some courts place the experts in the jury box. However, many tribunals and 
courts have neither jury seats nor even much space for the public. In response, 
they have improvised, bringing in additional chairs and tables and, in the very 
smallest courts, seating the expert witnesses at the bar table opposite the 
lawyers. If concurrent evidence is to continue, then there would seem to be a 
need to design courts with space for a panel of expert witnesses. 
Another logistical difficulty emerges from the potential disorderliness of the 
“discussion.” The chorus of different participants, in conjunction with the free-
form structure, makes it difficult for anyone trying to record or transcribe the 
session to reliably identify speakers. 
F. Judicial Independence, Procedural Fairness, and Criminal Justice 
Concurrent evidence requires oversight and tends to encourage judicial 
intervention. It disrupts the adversarial trial and requires the judge to enable 
the experts to speak and comment on each other’s opinions without too much 
interference from the lawyers. The judge is also encouraged to ask questions. 
Allowing judges to become more active makes sense from the perspective of 
communication and comprehension, but increased participation may 
simultaneously raise concerns about judicial impartiality and procedural 
fairness within adversarial systems, particularly regarding criminal trials.69 
Many aspects of concurrent evidence have yet to be considered on appeal. 
Of particular concern are issues of procedural fairness (due process) and 
perceptions of fairness arising from the way concurrent evidence is 
implemented.70 A range of issues create potential problems: How should judges 
identify suitable cases? How should judges handle different levels of experience 
and confidence among the experts? How similar do the types of expertise have 
to be before the session becomes intellectually suspect? What should a judge do 
when an affluent party calls several experts against an impecunious litigant with 
one or even none? Should the length and vigor of cross-examination be limited? 
What should judges do when lawyers object to experts making long speeches 
during the first or second stage? What happens if an expert refuses to be 
constrained in their answers, appealing to their “paramount duty” to the court? 
If concurrent evidence makes a trial or the preparation for a trial more 
expensive in a particular case, is it reasonable or fair to expect a party to bear 
the additional cost? What happens when experts disagree about what was 
actually said during the pretrial meetings or are unable to sensibly negotiate? 
 
 69. See Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033–
35 (1975) (noting the perspective and limitations of judges in the adversarial system’s explication of 
truth). 
 70. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 115–57 (2006) (exploring the public 
perceptions of law and legal procedure). 
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Parties and their advocates may also argue about when a concurrent-
evidence session should be held.71 Concurrent evidence disrupts the adversarial 
trial because it breaks the continuity of the cases developed by the respective 
parties. Concurrent evidence may change the dynamics of adversarial litigation 
in some jurisdictions. Unavoidably, concurrent evidence introduces a range of 
new strategic decisions. 
These issues might not prove insurmountable. Judges and legal institutions, 
however, may be vulnerable if parties challenge concurrent evidence (and its 
related procedural developments). We have yet to see what appellate courts 
will make of concurrent evidence in the absence of much empirical evidence 
about costs, speed, veracity of outcomes, or public satisfaction. 
Lurking in the background of the recent reforms to civil procedure are the 
implications for criminal justice and, in Australia, the jury. In 2001, a senior 
judge in New South Wales proposed the cautious extension of pretrial joint 
conferences to criminal proceedings. Although Justice Wood recognized that “it 
is not always the case that the defense can assemble a team of forensic experts 
of equivalent experience and expertise to those who work full time for forensic 
science laboratories or police services,” he nevertheless commended pretrial 
conferences.72 Wood even provided an example of the advantages: “[D]oubts 
entertained by a defense expert may be dispelled by the additional information 
or explanation provided in a joint conference, allowing the accused more 
comfortably to offer an early plea of guilty, and thereby receive the benefit of 
the discounting attaching to that circumstance.”73 
The disparity in the resources and experts available to the state provides one 
reason for resisting the wholesale extension of pretrial conferences and 
concurrent evidence to criminal proceedings.74 Additional concerns arise from 
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. Is it appropriate or 
desirable, in adversarial proceedings, to require the defense experts to meet 
with the state’s forensic scientists and consultants prior to trial? Should the 
defense be obliged to reveal its “hand” or disclose weaknesses in the 
prosecution case if such notice will allow the state to repair or change its expert 
evidence? There is also a danger that experts, testifying in the more free-form, 
concurrent-evidence session, might inadvertently disclose inadmissible or highly 
prejudicial information. 
 
 71. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.35 (N.S.W.) (listing possibilities for the 
presentation of expert evidence). 
 72. James Wood, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the 8th 
Greek Australian International Legal & Medical Conference: Expert Witnesses: The New Era (June 
2001), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speech_ 
wood_010601. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Michael Saks & Jonathan Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005) (explaining how many longstanding forensic science 
techniques have not been empirically tested). 
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VI 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING PRACTICES 
Some of the emerging responses to concurrent evidence merit consideration. 
It might not come as a surprise to find that the experiences and impressions of 
lawyers, experts, and a wider selection of judges and commissioners, present 
more variegated impressions than those of the proponents. 
A. Case Lore 
Representations of concurrent evidence in published decisions are generally 
positive. The most familiar refrains among the growing number of Australian 
decisions documenting the use of concurrent evidence (and “hot tubbing”) refer 
to the assistance obtained by the fact finder and to the savings in time and, 
implicitly, resources. Comments by the Tribunal in Ironbridge Holdings Pty 
Ltd. and WA Planning Commission are typical: 
The experts are to be commended for having participated in this process in a 
professional and diligent manner. While significant professional disagreement 
remained between them, their endeavours enabled the Tribunal to quickly grasp 
complex issues of traffic engineering involving a number of variables. Had this 
evidence been received in the way in which it is in most courts and tribunals, it is likely 
to have taken a week or more. In contrast, the concurrent evidence in the Tribunal 
took less than a day.75 
Similarly, the use of case-management techniques and concurrent evidence 
in Uniting Church Homes, Inc. and City of Stirling meant that the “final hearing 
which might well have occupied up to two weeks, took the equivalent of one 
hearing day.”76 Taken at face value, the selective use of concurrent evidence 
seems to have the potential to radically reduce hearing times. 
In other reported decisions, concurrent evidence is linked to cooperative 
interactions, concessions, and even agreement. Consider Gangemi and the Shire 
of Margaret River: 
[D]uring the course of the hearing, [two experts] were requested to confer with each 
other to determine the extent to which they agreed as to matters of land capability, 
and to identify the issues in respect of which they disagreed. They were then called 
together, and gave concurrent evidence. As it happened, the process of consultation 
ultimately gave rise to agreement of all issues of land capability, and [the experts] 
together prepared a plan depicting the different areas of productive agricultural land 
within the lot. Counsel for both sides were extremely co-operative in this process and 
can take much credit for its success. The process led to a far more effective resolution 
of the matter the subject of the witness’s expertise than might have been expected by 
the traditional process of tender of reports and cross examination of each of the 
witnesses at length on those reports.77 
 
 75. Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd. and WA Planning Comm’n, DR 345, ¶ 44 (Admin. Trib. (W. 
Austl.), Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2007. 
 76. Uniting Church Homes Inc. and City of Stirling, RD 6, ¶ 31 (Admin. Trib. (W. Austl.), Aug. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2005. 
 77. Gangemi and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River, RD 126, ¶ 26 (Admin. Trib. (W. Austl.), June 
2, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2005 (emphases added); see also 
Brescia v. QBE, No. 50082/05, LEXIS BC200705312, ¶¶ 160–61 (N.S.W., July 6, 2007); Gumana v. N. 
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In cases like Gangemi, when counsel and experts are “extremely 
cooperative,” it may be that concurrent evidence will help to narrow or resolve 
the dispute. Indeed, in some types of litigation—such as in a planning 
jurisdiction (for example, the Land and Environment Court of New South 
Wales) where there is considerable scope for creativity, discretion, and 
cooperative compromise—pretrial meetings and concurrent evidence might be 
especially helpful. One should, however, be careful equating collegiality, 
cooperation, and consensus with the absence of partisanship or inferring that 
expert agreement or compromise produces accurate or reliable evidence. The 
kinds of compromises that can be negotiated between town planners or 
geographers in relation to the size of a building or the uses of land, for example, 
might not be appropriate in professional negligence proceedings or between 
forensic scientists in criminal matters. 
Notwithstanding its apparent successes, concurrent evidence does not 
invariably save time or help to clarify, or even narrow, areas of disagreement. It 
certainly does not guarantee concurrence, compromise, or even civility. In 
Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd. v. Ford, Justice Harrison explained that the 
concurrent evidence served “to highlight the absence of any likelihood of 
agreement between [the expert witnesses] on important issues” and 
“degenerated . . . into an interdisciplinary brawl.”78 In Jetset Properties v. 
Eurobodalla Shire Council, the proximity of the experts did not generate 
concessions, compromise, or moderation.79 In that case, the proximity of peers 
seemed to exert little influence, at all: 
The opinions of the two sets of experts were far apart. They relied on different 
methodologies, used different data and reached different conclusions. Each believed 
that the methodology and data used by the other was useless. I detected no hint of 
recognition on either side of the professional competence of the other.80 
In Synergy Environmental Planning v. Cessnock City Council (No. 2), the 
experts could not even agree on what was said during the pretrial meetings.81 
“In this case, the evidence during the hearing showed that the experts, who 
could not even reach agreement on a true record of their joint conferences, 
remain far apart on technical matters, necessitating a Court decision on the 
facts and merits of those issues.”82 In Morrison and Repatriation Commission, 
the applicant relied upon the assistance of an expert witness who had limited 
familiarity with the medical specialization deemed relevant to the case.83 
 
Terr. (2005) 141 F.C.R. 457, ¶ 173; Winters v. Att’y Gen. of N.S.W., No. 40730/07, 2008 WL 715461, ¶ 
167 (N.S.W. Ct. App., Mar. 18, 2008). 
 78. Perpetual Tr. Vict. Ltd. v. Ford, No. 15045, 2008 WL 278422, ¶ 43 (N.S.W., Feb. 1, 2008). 
 79. Jetset Prop. v. Eurobodalla Shire Council, No. 10685, ¶ 42 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., May 9, 
2007), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2007. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Synergy Envtl. Planning v. Cessnock City Council (No. 2), No. 11353, ¶ 9 (N.S.W. Land & 
Env’t Ct., Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2005. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Morrison and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2005/47 (Admin. App. Trib., Aug. 2, 2006), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2006. 
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According to the Commission’s decision, this seemed to create confusion and 
complexity that was not reduced by concurrent evidence.84 
Trial judges have also encountered resistance to the use of concurrent 
evidence when the stakes are large and new procedures introduce uncertainty 
and risk. In “mega-litigation” over the rights to televise Australian Rules 
Football, a federal judge encouraged the parties to use concurrent evidence to 
“reduce the areas of disagreement and limit the hearing time required for 
exploring the remaining differences.”85 This proposal was “strenuously resisted 
by the Respondents”86 and, to the limited extent it was used, did not prevent 
one of the experts from displaying “a tendency to argue the case on behalf of 
Telstra [a respondent], rather than confine herself to her area of expertise” 
despite the presence of other experts.87 
Nor can one be confident that concurrent evidence will ease 
decisionmaking. Even when the process is orderly and constructive, the 
decisionmaker is required to weigh “the differing opinions.” At the hearing in 
Rezk and Australian Postal Corporation the experts gave their evidence 
concurrently: “Neither expert compromised on [his] initial diagnosis. . . . 
The concurrent evidence clarified some elements of the different diagnosis but 
still left the tribunal with the task of resolving the differing opinions.”88 
Finally, in Halverson v. Dobler, a professional-negligence action, the 
concurrent evidence sessions were publicly valorized.89 The main question at 
trial was whether the failure to perform an electrocardiogram was negligent and 
causally linked to the catastrophic brain injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The 
presiding judge, Peter McClellan, the leading proponent of concurrent 
evidence, thought the concurrent-evidence sessions proceeded in a “highly 
productive and efficient” manner. 
Each cardiologist prepared at least one written report and they met prior to giving 
their evidence in order to refine the issues falling within their areas of experience. 
They gave evidence concurrently, [one expert] participating by way of video link. This 
process proved both highly productive and efficient and has been of great benefit to 
me in resolving this case. The discussion was sustained at a high level of objectivity by 
all participants, each of whom displayed a genuine endeavour to assist the court to 
resolve the problems. The fact that ultimately they disagreed on critical issues was not 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd., No. 1223, 2007 WL 2137775, ¶ 23 (Austl., July 27, 2007). 
 86. Id. ¶ 25. 
 87. Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd. (2007) 151 F.C.R. 450, ¶ 14. 
 88. Rezk and Austl. Postal Co., No. N2002/1720, 2005 WL 165614, ¶¶ 49, 51 (Admin. App. Trib., 
Jan. 18, 2005); see also Reardon and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2002/1115 ¶ 30 (Admin. App. Trib., 
June 26, 2003), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2003/ (stating that experts’ 
individual positions did not change as a result of the concurrent-evidence approach). Contra Gibbins 
and Austl. Postal Co., No. N2002/1655, 2003 WL 22073351, ¶ 69 (Admin. App. Trib., July 31, 2003) 
(noting experts’ courtesy and professionalism). 
 89. Halverson v. Dobler, No. 20182/03, LEXIS BC200609964, ¶¶ 17, 104, 145 (N.S.W., Dec. 1, 
2006); see also Wilson v. Tier, No. 20622/2001, LEXIS BC200800781, ¶ 119 (N.S.W., Feb. 22, 2008) 
(transcript from the concurrent-evidence session is reproduced in the judgment). 
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due to anything other than a genuine difference of opinion about the appropriate 
conclusion to be drawn from the known facts.90 
Halverson, perhaps, represents the apogee of concurrent evidence. 
McClellan is a senior judge with considerable experience using the technique. It 
might not be surprising, therefore, to find that concurrent evidence generally 
works well in his court. This does, however, raise an important point for the 
extension of concurrent evidence (and law-reform initiatives more generally). 
How do the new procedures work in situations with less-accomplished, less-
experienced, and less-enthusiastic judges and commissioners? Although the 
emerging case law provides a partial answer, it might not be appropriate to 
evaluate concurrent evidence according to particular cases or to extrapolate 
from the impressions and experiences of undoubtedly able, but perhaps not 
entirely representative, judges. 
Halverson, however, is also interesting for other reasons. The case 
demonstrates how the decisionmaker used conventional models of science for 
assessing witnesses and rationalizing the decision. Consider, for example, the 
summary of the concurrent evidence of the general practitioners: 
There were significant differences between the responses of the general practitioners 
to some critical questions . . . . Although all of the doctors brought a useful perspective 
to the various problems to my mind Dr Mackey’s evidence was of the greatest 
assistance. . . . I was also impressed by Dr Bunker, who was prepared to make 
reasonable and appropriate concessions which tended to qualify his primary position. 
This was not always the case with Drs. Ford and Walsh.91 
Considerations such as willingness to make concessions, clarity of opinion, 
reasonableness, relevant experience, and the ability to quickly and credibly 
respond to alternative perspectives may help judges to choose between 
divergent opinions. They can be used to attribute “objectivity” to specific 
cardiologists and privilege particular performances—like those of Dr. Mackey 
and Dr. Bunker—but they do not necessarily address the bases for holding 
opinions: the reliability of the opinions, assumptions, and underlying facts, the 
relevance of the expertise, the representativeness of the experts, or the extent of 
support in authoritative literatures. 
Overall, when concurrent evidence works, its success seems to be limited to 
reducing the length of the trial and possibly to helping the decisionmaker 
understand the expert evidence. The case law tells us little, though, about 
partisanship, objectivity, the proper rate of concessions, or the deleterious 
effects of adversarial bias. 
B. Listening to Lawyers and Experts 
Limitations with the civil-procedural reforms, and some of the strained 
relations with adversarial justice, emerge more clearly from the experiences of 
lawyers (barristers and solicitors) and expert witnesses. The following 
 
 90. Halverson, LEXIS BC200609964, ¶ 101 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 67–68. 
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perspectives, which do not require much explanation, were selected because 
they introduce ambivalence and provide insights conspicuously absent from the 
judicial encomium. They are extracted from dozens of semi-structured 
interviews, discussions, and months of court observation conducted during 2007 
and 2008.92 
1. Interviews with Lawyers: Concurrent Evidence 
“Concurrent evidence is . . . a bit like communism, good in theory but it doesn’t work 
in practice.” (Solicitor) 
“If you’ve got more than two witnesses it just becomes hellish.” (Barrister) 
“The concurrent evidence deficiency, I see, is that people are thrown in the deep end 
and perhaps the force of the personality rather than the logic of the evidence is going 
to win the day.” (Barrister) 
“I think it leads to a less efficient and a less forceful presentation of evidence.” 
(Barrister) 
“Firstly . . . the ideal of them sitting in the witness box and having this discourse with 
each other never happens. . . . To the extent that they do talk to each other in the 
witness box it’s usually, ‘Have you got a pencil’ rather than, ‘I think you’ve got that 
wrong.’ They don’t cross-examine each other.” (Barrister) 
“If I want to examine, I will cross-examine in concurrent evidence even if some 
commissioners or judges think it’s undesirable, because you are still entitled to test 
that person’s evidence.” (Barrister) 
“The judges miss being barristers half the time because cross-examination is the best 
part of the job and so they sit up on the bench and have a bit of a go.” (Barrister) 
2. Interviews with Lawyers: Pretrial Meetings and Joint Reports 
“Joint meetings [are] probably honest and good.” (Barrister) 
“Barristers [and judges] don’t actually see all the shit that goes on before it gets to, 
you know [court] . . . they are sort of living in a slightly elevated stratosphere.” 
(Solicitor) 
It wasn’t quick, it wasn’t cheap, and it wasn’t just. (Solicitor) 
3. Interviews with Lawyers: Partisanship 
“I’m not saying that there aren’t some people out there who are hired guns but people 
knew who they were. The commissioners knew who they were and the judges knew 
who they were and nobody would pay any attention to them, and if you wanted to go 
to court and your client turned up with somebody who was one of those people, you 
would say “I’m not going to court with that expert because that expert is not 
somebody whose opinion is valued.” (Barrister) 
“This whole idea that people make up their mind because of the check that they’re 
getting is offensive.” (Barrister) 
 
 92. The author conducted more than fifty formal interviews with experts, lawyers, judges, and 
court workers in N.S.W. 
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“Credibility is the main thing I’m looking for. You don’t want an advocate for your 
case. . . . You want . . . someone who is going to give an opinion that can be relied 
upon.” (Barrister) 
“I never really found there were hired guns.” (Barrister) 
“I think the judiciary gets overly concerned about trying to find an expert that doesn’t 
exist.” (Barrister) 
4. Interviews with Lawyers: Other 
[On the procedural reforms] “[I]t’s wrong if it’s solely directed to save court time and 
expense. I think that’s a sad reflection on justice if we have to have to have systems 
imposed on us simply to save time and money.” (Barrister) 
“Judges want to initially appear progressive and they want to come up with rules that 
speed things up. I would be in favour of judges that come up with rules that slow 
things down. Because it might be a truism to say that justice delayed is justice denied, 
but it’s certainly true that to say that cases that are rushed through are not doing the 
ends of justice much of a favour either.” (Barrister) 
“My experience and the experience of all my fellow practitioners is that it doesn’t save 
costs.” (Barrister) 
“They want it to be just quick and cheap, not ‘just, quick, and cheap.’ . . . Justice 
requires that the parties feel they’ve had a fair hearing.” (Solicitor) 
5. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Concurrent Evidence 
“In a lot of cases it’s unpredictable as to how it’s going to go. . . . The questions, the 
issues that arise, the ability to cross-examine.” 
“[E]xperts, you would hope, know more about the issues than the barristers or the 
judge. So if you’re allowed to ask some questions of the other experts then you might 
bring something out that no one otherwise will bring out.” 
“It does give you a bit more of an opportunity to talk, only when the, generally when 
the commissioner asks. . . . In my case, anyway, it’s very rare that I would unilaterally 
offer some information.” 
“I don’t think your client’s case is best served by pillorying the other expert. . . . I don’t 
think it’s appropriate to challenge the beliefs of the other expert.” 
“Cross-examination should come back into it.” 
6. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Meetings and Joint Reports 
“I think they are incredibly important to the whole process. . . . I find it astounding. 
Every time I go into a joint conference I say ‘I’ll write it.’ And the other person says 
‘I’m happy for you to write it and you send it to me and I’ll put in my comments.’ That 
sounds just mind-blowing to me because you take control of the whole process.” 
“[I]f you’ve had a joint meeting one of you has to produce a document, a document’s 
produced and by a large each of the parties are able to add something else in which 
they wish to emphasise. Where it gets difficult is if a person makes a particular point 
and the person makes an edit and the other person responds to it . . . . It’s endless.” 
“The system now is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination. Because some times 
I’ve been involved in joint conferencing with other experts who have raised issues that 
even the solicitors haven’t raised and wanted to raise issues that no one else had raised 
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at all. I kept saying you can’t do that. You can’t raise issues that aren’t being raised. 
And, they’d just ignore me.” 
“Totally dependent on the attitudes of the participants.” 
“It’s hideous, it’s absolutely hideous.” 
7. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Partisanship 
“Give me the material and I will tell you whether or not I can support your case . . . . 
And quite often the advice will be, ‘No, I can’t support your case.’ . . . That process of 
saying up front whether I can or can’t support your case means that I’m not getting 
instructions saying you’ve got to say this or say that.” 
“Clearly my role is to express my views and to test the views of the other person. So, 
both of us are being impartial but we’re representing views that we genuinely hold 
which align with the views of our respective clients.” 
“Certainly, when you act for a party, and they’re present, and you know you’re being 
paid, you feel a little bit more heat to give the evidence that you’ve prepared.” 
“I don’t ever want to be taking anything on [so] that I end up thinking that ‘I wish I 
wasn’t here.’” 
8. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Other 
“I think some of the other reforms, particularly the focus now on time, is just that it’s a 
focus on a measure of efficiency, because its measurable, rather than a measure of 
quality.” 
“There’s been a move towards focusing on dispensing with things quickly which has 
not necessarily created quality outcomes and better decisions.” 
“Well that, of course, is the process that the court’s been going through. It’s been 
reducing the time spent in court, it’s been reducing its own costs, but the costs I think 
tend to be higher external to the court . . . . So, I mean the court ought to be looking at 
both sides of the coin not just one. . . . It’s all very well to improve the system but 
you’ve got to improve it in a way that’s going to benefit all the parties not simply one.” 
“[M]y experience with my clients is that while the cost to the court may seem to have 
decreased, the cost to my clients has increased by one hundred and fifty per cent.” 
C. Overview 
These perspectives introduce complexity. The case law and empirical 
research suggests that experience with concurrent evidence is, in reality, quite 
varied. The responses of other judges, lawyers, and experts are not altogether 
negative, but they do not consistently align with the claims made by proponents. 
These perspectives, in conjunction with discussions and court observations, 
enable some generalization. 
On average, lawyers tend to dislike the concurrent-evidence procedures, 
especially the idiosyncratic ways in which they are implemented by the various 
institutions and individual judges. As Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd.93 
suggests, to the extent that they introduce or accentuate uncertainty, new rules 
 
 93. (2007) 151 F.C.R. 450 (Austl.). 
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and procedures tend to be unwelcome. That these reforms were twinned—
temporally and ideologically—with substantial revisions to tort law served to 
heighten the misgivings of many legal practitioners.94 Even though lawyers 
tended to dislike these reforms to civil procedure, those lawyers most familiar 
with concurrent evidence were not always the most critical. Criticism could also 
be divided according to the division of legal labor. Solicitors were more inclined 
to criticize reforms to pretrial processes and barristers to speak against changes 
to the adversarial character of the trial. 
Experts, on the other hand, were generally favorably disposed toward 
concurrent evidence, though they tended to be a little more ambivalent about 
the pretrial joint conferences. They doubted their ability to substantially reduce 
disagreement or reach agreement, in or out of court. Nor did they frame their 
interactions with other experts in terms of partisanship or idealized norms. 
Rather, recognizing that there could be genuine disagreement, several 
suggested that opposing experts were sometimes incompetent and 
unprofessional. Interestingly, these experts favored concurrent evidence 
because it afforded an opportunity to express their views and the potential to 
make opposing experts publicly accountable for their purported incompetence. 
Alternatively, some expert witnesses, as the extracts reveal, were reluctant to 
speak unilaterally, let alone express skepticism about the opinions of opposing 
experts. 
These findings, along with the discussion in Section V, suggest that the 
conventional models of science and expertise underpinning the rationalization 
of concurrent evidence and pretrial meetings seem to be misconceived and 
misleading. 
VII 
CONCLUSION: A USEFUL TOOL WITH LIMITED POTENTIAL 
Concurrent evidence is not a panacea for partisanship, adversarial bias, or 
the difficulties created by expert disagreement and decisionmaking in the face 
of uncertainty. Even when experts and lawyers cooperate and the procedures 
reduce the length of proceedings, concurrent evidence can leave the fact finder 
with a messy transcript and conflicting reports, and it can require more pretrial 
activity and impose higher costs on the parties. Nevertheless, concurrent 
evidence is not necessarily a bad thing. The procedure has the potential to 
improve communication and comprehension and the conditions under which 
lay fact finders make decisions about the evidence before them. The marketing 
of the recent reforms, closely linked to the invocation of inappropriate models 
of expertise, along with a general disinterest in empirical evidence about the 
domestic litigation landscape and the value of the recent reforms, are of 
concern. Notably, there seems to be little evidence to support the contention 
 
 94. See, e.g., Civil Liability Act, 2002 (N.S.W.). 
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that concurrent evidence “tends to reduce the level of partisanship.”95 On the 
whole, the potential of concurrent evidence seems to have been exaggerated. 
The disjuncture between the models of science motivating the public 
rationalization and implementation of concurrent evidence on the one hand, 
and what we know about science and expertise on the other, is rather stark. The 
Australian reforms seem to be predicated on antiquated and tendentious, if 
pervasive, ideas about scientific conventions.96 The specter of Merton’s norms 
haunts the Australian reform agenda, just as the ghost of Karl Popper 
manifested in the judicial necromancy associated with Daubert.97 It might come 
as a surprise to some judges, but communalism, collegiality, disinterestedness, 
and skeptical attitudes do not seem to be prerequisites for contemporary 
scientific activity.98 
Sociologically, the origins of the Australian reforms are interesting because 
the proponents, it seems, are the main beneficiaries. Under the auspices of 
producing more impartial expertise, improving access to justice, and improving 
in-court communications, Australian judges have unilaterally devised and 
imposed procedures intended to encourage settlement, reduce the number of 
issues ventilated in the courtroom, reduce costs, and render (judicial) 
decisionmaking easier. The reforms move interactions between experts from 
the courtroom to private pretrial spheres. They also impose new burdens on the 
experts, lawyers, and parties. Most significantly, the reforms give trial judges 
unprecedented control over expert evidence and consolidate judicial influence 
over the early stages of proceedings. There is no evidence, and apparently 
limited interest, in the question of whether the procedural reforms have 
improved access to justice. 
We might question the desirability of law reform, emerging fully formed, 
from the apex of the dispute pyramid. One expert wondered, “Why don’t they 
[the judges] engage with other people before they produce them [the civil 
procedural reforms]? It just doesn’t make sense. . . . Why would you do that 
without consultation?” There are good reasons, as this article has endeavored 
to explain, why law reform should not be a top-down process and should not be 
dominated by judges. There should have been far more consultation with 
interested groups. Wider engagement might have helped proponents to 
recognize some of the weaknesses and limitations with the new procedures. It 
 
 95. Heerey, supra note 39, at 391. 
 96. See Mike Michael, Lay Discourses of Science: Science-In-General, Science-In-Particular, and 
Self, 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 313, 313 (1992) (exploring the influence of social institutions and 
norms on the public’s understanding of science). 
 97. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History, 
Philosophy and Sociology of Science in U.S. Federal Courts, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 309 (2002) 
(discussing the use of literature from the history, philosophy, and sociology of science in federal 
jurisprudence before and after Daubert). 
 98. See STEVEN YEARLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL STUDY 
OF SCIENCE (2005); HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 
1995).  
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might have led proponents to wonder why so much of the reform agenda has 
been directed toward experts rather than lawyers and judges. 
Approaching civil-procedural reform from the narrow perspective of 
concern about expert partisanship and institutional efficiency tends to 
marginalize important dimensions of social justice. Does it make sense, for 
example, to impose new procedures based on concerns about adversarial bias 
when large civil defendants can simply send their legally acculturated 
consultants (or employees) to any pretrial conference? More fundamentally, 
focusing on local incidents of partisanship detracts from macroscopic social and 
policy considerations such as the commercialization of biomedical research, 
regulatory capture, the lack of publicly funded health research, questions about 
who should bear the risk when profitable new products are marketed, and what 
these should mean for tort and product-liability law, practice, and reform.99 
At this point I want to reiterate an important, if controversial, claim. In the 
absence of much empirical information or legal theorizing about expert 
partisanship and bias, it is possible that they do not present particularly serious 
problems in most civil matters. One of the major advantages with free proof is 
that, apart from enhancing satisfaction with the legal system, it keeps the issue 
of partisanship in focus. Adversarial procedures—which include scope for 
vigorous cross-examination—constantly remind us of the limitations of 
expertise; the intractable nature of expert disagreement; the prevalence of 
alignments, commitments, and interests; and other potential biasing factors. 
Expert disagreement creates problems primarily because there are no simple 
means of resolving disagreement in socially legitimate ways. Attributions of bias 
(and objectivity and impartiality) are unlikely to produce bright lines for 
understanding or assessing particular proffers of expert evidence. They are of 
limited value in determining the reliability of expert-opinion evidence or the 
authenticity of disagreement and, without more, do not present constructive 
bases for law reform. 
For those who believe in the possibility of obtaining unbiased expertise, the 
failure to obtain genuine expert evidence, along with the appearance of bias, 
may represent very serious threats to legal institutions and social order. 
However, more-theoretically and empirically plausible models of expertise 
make simplistic models of bias (and, implicitly, objectivity and impartiality) 
both less tenable and less threatening. Once we realize that strong forms of 
objectivity are not attainable, we can begin to craft more-principled models of 
expertise that are adequate for forensic purposes. Inevitably, there will be 
ongoing debates about the meaning of adequacy, appropriate standards for 
 
 99. See Margaret Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the 
Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
289, 291 (Spring/Summer 2001) (noting the ability of federal district courts to use the Daubert trilogy to 
shape procedural and substantive law of toxic-tort litigation); CARL CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, 
LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006) (a critical assessment of judicial responses to scientific 
evidence in toxic-tort litigation). 
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admissibility, who should bear the burden of proof, the technical competence of 
fact finders, and the extent to which rules and procedures should be uniform 
across different legal domains. 
At its most modest, concurrent evidence has the potential to improve 
communication and comprehension in the courtroom. Concurrent evidence 
may reduce costs, encourage settlement, and expedite legal proceedings, and 
the presence of opposing experts may exert some discipline on witnesses. 
Pretrial meetings may help to identify the main areas of difference between the 
experts and reduce the time expert witnesses eventually spend in court. 
Simultaneously, its use may create difficulties and introduce new risks. Whether 
potential improvements in the provision and reception of testimony outweigh 
hurdles and dangers is a question that probably depends on the circumstances 
of individual cases, the proclivities of the participants, and the way in which 
different legal systems value rights, efficiency, fairness, accuracy, public 
confidence, and empirical evidence.100 
Recent Australian reforms reveal much about legal conventions generally. 
Legal models of science and expertise tend to be simplistic and highly idealized. 
They tend to be invoked strategically in judgments and law reform to support 
the predilections and interests of judges. Like their counterparts in many 
common-law jurisdictions, Australian judges continue to believe that genuine 
expertise thrives just beyond the courtroom and the lawyer’s office. For them, 
the problem has become how to configure rules of evidence and procedures to 
encourage genuine experts to produce trustworthy opinions in court. 
Unfortunately there are few operational means for resolving expert 
disagreement, demarcating science from nonscience, or readily determining 
whether partisanship detrimentally affects the validity or reliability of particular 
expert opinions. That judges believe they can implement procedural solutions 
to these perennial epistemic difficulties is perhaps the most interesting aspect of 
recent developments in Anglo-Australian civil procedure. 
 
 
 100. See Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S49, S49–S58 (2005) (arguing that the Daubert trilogy misconstrues scientific 
practice and its relationship with the law). 
